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INSTITUTIONAL BRIDGING: HOW LARGE 
LAW FIRMS ENGAGE IN GLOBALIZATION 
John Flood* 
Abstract: This Article introduces the “Born Global” concept into the dis-
cussion of law firms and lawyers. Born Global firms are companies that 
globalize at an accelerated rate. This Article illustrates that English and 
American law firms are the precursors to Born Global companies and 
highlights how the common law facilitated this process. It also demon-
strates, through modern case studies, how lawyers and the common law 
continue to have a globalizing effect in the business world. Last, the Arti-
cle argues that the disparity between U.K. and U.S. law firms created by 
the U.K. Legal Services Act of 2007 may create an opportunity for U.K. 
law firms to truly break out ahead of their U.S. counterparts. 
Introduction 
 The aim of this Article is to show how, whether unwittingly or cov-
ertly, large law firms have always had some form of globalization in 
their organizational genes. It argues that law firms are predominantly 
responsive institutions rather than proactive institutions, as they react 
to clients’ demands instead of supplying their own initiatives to clients. 
Within the theme of globalization, there is a set of functional divisions 
in history that represent distinct periods of economic and social activity, 
although these are subject to critique.1 These periods are exemplified 
by the Industrial Revolution of the nineteenth century, the age of war 
and decline of empire in the early twentieth century, and the growth of 
internationalization and globalization in the late twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries.2 
 This Article introduces a new concept into the legal profession 
analysis—the concept of the “Born Global” or International New Ven-
 
* © 2013, John Flood, Leverhulme Research Fellow, Professor of Law and Sociology, 
University of Westminster. I am grateful to the organizers of the joint Boston College Law 
Review/International & Comparative Law Review Symposium, Filling Power Vacuums in the New 
Global Legal Order, and to the participants for their comments and stimulation. 
1 See generally David Held et al., Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and 
Culture (1999) (discussing globalization in various contexts and time periods); Dominique 
Martin et al., The Sociology of Globalization: Theoretical and Methodological Reflections, 21 Int’l 
Soc. 499 (2006) (critiquing the traditional definition and conception of globalization). 
2 This Article focuses on the early period (the nineteenth century) and the late peri-
ods (the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries). 
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tures. The Born Global concept first emerged in management and 
business literature and is used to characterize companies that globalize 
at an accelerated rate as a result of their built-in global dimension. By 
contrast, traditional businesses acquire global attributes as they develop 
and mature by steadily acquiring resources over time. According to the 
literature on Born Globals, they are a new and original type of com-
pany that is a creature of globalization. This Article uses this model to 
show that law firms were the precursors to the Born Global concept as 
it is understood today. 
 Part I of this Article reprises the literature on law firms and their 
global ambitions, focusing on the promotion of New York and English 
law as the templates for transnational work.3 Next, Part II introduces the 
concept of Born Globals as an ideal type, and highlights how law firms 
and other global professional service firms have embodied elements of 
the Born Global structure from their early stages.4 Part III then presents 
case studies of types of work done by law firms in the global arena, based 
on case studies that I collected in my earlier work.5 Last, Part IV argues 
that regulatory changes based on competition policy within the global 
arena are having positive effects on the work of global law firms; yet, 
they are also causing dissension within the legal community as these 
changes upset many traditional community standards.6 
I. The Rise of Global Big Law 
 Section A examines the rise of global big law, identifies some of the 
main characteristics, and compares law firms in the United States and 
the United Kingdom.7 Section B then discusses how to moderate the 
notion of global law firms expanding globally while simultaneously 
maintaining their local focus.8 Last, Section C considers how the com-
mon law has enabled the success of capitalism and legal practitioners in 
global law firms.9 
                                                                                                                      
3 See infra notes 7–84 and accompanying text. 
4 See infra notes 85–135 and accompanying text. 
5 See infra notes 136–274 and accompanying text. 
6 See infra notes 275–289 and accompanying text. 
7 See infra notes 10–47 and accompanying text. 
8 See infra notes 48–53 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 54–84 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Rise of Global Law Firms: The United States and the United Kingdom 
 There are relatively few large, transnational law firms within the 
general population of law firms.10 They are, however, big: the largest 
of them have over 3000 lawyers located in offices throughout the 
world.11 Nevertheless, they are small in comparison to the major ac-
counting firms. For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP has more 
than 180,500 professionals working in 160 countries.12 In contrast, 
DLA Piper LLP has 4200 lawyers in seventy-seven offices in twenty-
nine countries;13 Clifford Chance has 3400 lawyers in thirty-five offices 
in twenty-five countries;14 and Baker & McKenzie has over 4000 attor-
neys in seventy-two offices in forty-five countries.15 
 Despite the limited number of large, transnational law firms, the 
enormous growth in law firms has led to the intensification of speciali-
zation within law firms and between offices of the same firm.16 Firms 
have become a set of networks, with each department or section inside 
a firm becoming a firm within a firm.17 Thus, in addition to the compe-
tition between firms for clients and work, specialization within firms has 
led to intra-firm competition.18 Each of the departments within the 
firm is in constant battle with the others for resources and remunera-
tion.19 
                                                                                                                      
10 Compare Global Annual Review 2012: Facts and Figures, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, 
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/annual-review/facts-figures.jhtml (select “People View” hyper-
link) (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (indicating that there are over 180,500 professionals working 
at the accounting firm, PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP), and PwC Member Firm Locations, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/office-locations/index.jhtml 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (indicating all of PricewaterhouseCoopers’ firm locations), with 
About Us, Clifford Chance, http://www.cliffordchance.com/about_us.html (last visited Apr. 
19, 2013) (noting that there are 3400 lawyers at the firm), and DLA Piper LLP, http:// 
www.dlapiper.com (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (indicating that there are 4200 lawyers at the 
firm). 
11 E.g., About Us, supra note 10; DLA Piper LLP, supra note 10. 
12 Global Annual Review 2012: Facts and Figures, supra note 10; PwC Member Firm Loca-
tions, supra note 10. 
13 DLA Piper LLP, supra note 10. 
14 About Us, supra note 10. 
15 Firm Facts, Baker & McKenzie, http://www.bakermckenzie.com/firmfacts (last up-
dated Oct. 2012). 
16 See John Flood, Lawyers as Sanctifiers: The Role of Elite Law Firms in International Busi-
ness Transactions, 14 Ind. J. Global Legal Stud. 35, 50 (2007). 
17 See Gerard Hanlon, Lawyers, the State and the Market: Professionalism Re-
visited 129–30 (1999); Flood, supra note 16, at 50. 
18 Flood, supra note 16, at 50. 
19 Id. 
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 This is exemplified by one scholar’s analysis of the firm-within-a-
firm structures that operate to prevent fission.20 The general move to 
“eat what you kill” remuneration, however, has militated against some 
of these preventative measures and served to intensify competition be-
tween lawyers, creating a far more fluid market for lawyers between 
firms.21 The American Lawyer Global 100 shows that five of the top ten 
listed firms are based in the United Kingdom; the others are headquar-
tered in the United States.22 Although the U.K. firms had been in the 
minority, they are now on par with U.S. firms.23 All of the top firms 
gross over $1 billion, and the top two gross over $2 billion each.24 
 Because the U.S. legal profession does not have artificial divisions 
of labor like the U.K. profession, U.S. lawyers are expected to offer a 
full range of services, which inevitably includes litigation expertise. A 
firm like Cravath, Swaine & Moore (“Cravath”), for example, handles 
full-scale capital markets work in tandem with defending the New York 
Times in court in high-profile First Amendment cases.25 U.K. law firms, 
on the other hand, typically outsource the courtroom advocacy com-
ponents of their litigation work to the Bar,26 and are only beginning to 
acquire the capacity to take cases into court without using barristers.27 
Furthermore, when U.K. law firms have established offices in cities like 
New York, their inexperience in litigation and their difficulty in attract-
ing good U.S. litigators have hindered their success in the U.S. market. 
 The distinction between the two legal cultures—the American and 
British—is important because of the way that business is now conduct-
ing its relationships. Engaging in disputes no longer necessarily means 
                                                                                                                      
20 See Emmanuel Lazega, The Collegial Phenomenon: The Social Mechanisms of 
Cooperation Among Peers in a Corporate Law Partnership 182–200 (2001). 
21 Flood, supra note 16, at 50. 
22 See The 2011 Global 100: Most Revenue, Am. Law., http://www.americanlawyer.com/Pub 
ArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202514393371&slreturn=20130020111305 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
23 Flood, supra note 16, at 50; see The 2011 Global 100: Most Revenue, supra note 22. 
24 The 2011 Global 100: Most Revenue, supra note 22 (indicating that Baker & McKenzie 
and Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP were the top two grossing law firms in 2011). 
25 Flood, supra note 16, at 51. 
26 See John Flood, Barristers, in 1 Legal Systems of the World: A Political, Social, 
and Cultural Encyclopedia 130, 131 (Herbert M. Kritzer ed., 2002) (comparing the work 
of English barristers, who argue cases before the court, and solicitors, who directly interact 
with clients); see also Flood, supra note 16, at 50–51 (stating that English law firms outsource 
the litigation components of their practice). 
27 Andy Boon & John Flood, Trials of Strength: The Reconfiguration of Litigation as a Con-
tested Terrain, 33 L. & Soc’y Rev. 595, 595–96 (1999); see also Flood, supra note 16, at 50–51 
(noting that England has only begun to permit solicitors to go into court without a barris-
ter). The movement toward permitting lawyers in England to go to court without barristers 
remains an exceptional change. See Flood, supra note 16, at 50–51. 
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either: (1) ignoring the contract and thrashing it executive-to-executive 
without the intervention of lawyers, or (2) going to court and breaking 
the business relationship.28 Rather, modern business is more likely to 
adopt the full range of techniques, legal and extra-legal, including liti-
gation, arbitration, alternative dispute resolution, and negotiation, 
without anyone sounding the death knell to the business relationship.29 
In fact, clients expect their law firm to provide them with a full menu of 
legal services. U.S. law firms are structured to provide this range, 
whereas U.K. firms are lacking in key areas. 
 Although it may seem that litigation expertise is only of use within 
domestic jurisdictions and therefore plays a limited role for the global 
lawyer, the converse is actually true. Litigation expertise is required in 
arbitration and in other non-state forms of dispute settlement.30 One 
pair of scholars has indicated that American law firms have succeeded in 
breaking the stranglehold of the old European notables in international 
arbitration by offering a formalized, U.S.-style approach—technocratic, 
as opposed to aristocratic—that is less dependent on personality and 
culture and more on rules.31 
 U.S. law firms, at their foundation, are supported by a large do-
mestic law market.32 For them, becoming global is dependent on the 
sustained development of their original markets.33 For example, suc-
cessful global U.S. law firms, like Cravath and Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen 
& Katz (“Wachtell Lipton”), primarily concentrate on their home mar-
kets and use the networks of overseas law firms to build their interna-
tional practices.34 
 By contrast, U.K. law firms have never possessed the luxury of a big 
domestic market, which has required them to seek work outside the 
United Kingdom.35 Imperialism provided conduits into profitable re-
                                                                                                                      
28 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 Am. 
Soc. Rev. 55, 60–62 (1963). 
29 Flood, supra note 16, at 52. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. (citing Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth, Dealing in Virtue: International 
Commercial Arbitration and the Construction of a Transnational Legal Order 
302 (1996)). 
32 See Carole Silver, Globalization and the U.S. Market in Legal Services—Shifting Identities, 
31 Law & Pol’y Int’l Bus. 1093, 1099–1100 (2000). 
33 Flood, supra note 16, at 52–53. 
34 Id. at 53. 
35 Id.; see also Laurie Dennett, Slaughter and May: A Century in the City 23 
(1989) (noting that John Morris, one of the founders of the law firm Ashurst Morris Crisp, 
frequently ventured across the Atlantic for his work in the United States). 
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gions such as the Middle East and Asia.36 As the globe has reconfigured 
itself, major regional associations, such as the European Union (EU), 
the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Association of 
South Eastern Asian Nations, were established.37 These big three re-
gional associations represent the bulk of inward and outward foreign 
direct investment flows in the world.38 Further, these regions have es-
tablished their own ways of handling disputes.39 Even organizations 
such as the World Trade Organization are developing their own juris-
prudence through dispute panels.40 
 In addition to their widespread domestic market, U.S. law firms 
also have the advantage of long ties with investment bank clients.41 The 
major investment banks that engage in capital market deals are head-
quartered in the United States, such as Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley, 
and Bank of America Merrill Lynch.42 This connection between law 
firms and the investment banks goes back more than one hundred 
years.43 And strangely, despite the lawyer-client relationship undergoing 
the change from one-stop shop to transactional relations in recent years, 
some of these particular ties have endured.44 
 Although some law firms have been able to rely on such traditional 
ties, the changes in the business landscape brought about by mergers 
and acquisitions and restructurings have made lawyer-client relations 
more tentative.45 In-house counsel are stricter about legal budgets, of-
                                                                                                                      
36 Flood, supra note 16, at 53. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. (citing Held et al., supra note 1, at 250–51). 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 See John Flood, Capital Markets: Those Who Can and Cannot Do the Purest Global Law 
Markets, in Rules and Networks: The Legal Culture of Global Business Transac-
tions 249, 254–55 (Richard P. Appelbaum et al. eds., 2001). 
42 Bank of America Corporation Company Information, Hoovers, http://www.hoovers. 
com/ (select “Company Information” hyperlink; log-in required) (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) 
(indicating that the company is headquartered in North Carolina); Contact Us, Morgan 
Stanley, http://www.morganstanley.com/contact_us.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (stat-
ing that worldwide headquarters is in New York City); Who We Are: At a Glance, Goldman 
Sachs, http://www.goldmansachs.com/who-we-are/at-a-glance/index.html (last visited Apr. 
19, 2013) (stating that the firm’s headquarters is in New York). Barclays Capital’s Americas 
headquarters is also located in New York City. New York—Americas Headquarters, Barclays 
Capital, http://www.barclayswealth.com/contact-us/americas/new-york.htm# (last visited 
Apr. 19, 2013). 
43 Flood, supra note 16, at 53; see also Flood, supra note 41, at 254 (noting that the rela-
tionship between Morgan Stanley and the U.S.-based law firm Davis Polk & Wardwell extends 
over 110 years). 
44 Flood, supra note 16, at 53. 
45 Id. 
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ten asking law firms to compete to obtain work.46 Because of this, law 
firms have had to market themselves and enlist the aid of the state in 
opening legal markets for them.47 
B. Moderating Acting Globally While Thinking Locally 
 The idea of acting globally while thinking locally is permissible so 
long as a firm is not constrained by local mores. The crucial question is: 
to what extent are international law firms merely exporting English or 
New York State law instead of engaging in the practice of local law? An 
earlier U.K. Lord Chancellor said: 
Our common law of contract is now a world-wide commodity. 
It has become so because it is a system that people like. In ever 
more complex, sophisticated and inter-related markets, Eng-
lish commercial law provides predictability of outcome, legal 
certainty and fairness. It is clear and is built upon well-founded 
principles, such as the ability to require exact performance 
and the absence of any general duty of good faith.48 
Thus, the large law firm’s main alliance is with the Anglo-American 
nexus, which is composed of neo-liberal democracy and respect for 
property rights, among other things.49 The firm, therefore, has to in-
corporate local norms into the overarching pattern devised in U.K. and 
U.S. law.50 
 Devising solutions for dovetailing sometimes incommensurable 
systems has led to the globalization of legal education and training. 
                                                                                                                      
46 Id. 
47 Id. For example, the retired Lord Chancellor Kenneth Clarke highlighted this in a 
speech to CityUK, an organization dedicated to promoting competitiveness in the U.K. fi-
nancial services industry, when he was lord chancellor and minister of justice. See Rt. Honor-
able Kenneth Clarke MP, Lord Chancellor & Sec’y of State for Justice, Address at the CityUK 
Future Litigation Event (Sept. 14, 2011), transcript available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/ 
news/press-releases/moj/pressrelease140911a. Clarke said: 
The first is promoting industry. I place enormous value on UK legal services, 
which are world-class, but I think we can do more to ensure they thrive. I am 
almost as much of an enthusiast for English law as I am for English cricket. 
That’s why I am keen to go in to bat with UKTI, the CityUK, the Law Society, 
the Bar Council and others, on your behalf. 
Id. 
48 Lord Falconer of Thoroton, Constitutional Affairs Sec’y and Lord Chancellor, Keynote 
Address at the KPMG Annual Law Lecture: International Opportunities, London ( Jan. 26, 
2006), transcript available at http://www.dca.gov.uk/speeches/2006/sp060126.htm. 
49 Flood, supra note 16, at 54. 
50 Id. 
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Young lawyers from jurisdictions outside the Anglo-American legal tra-
dition now find it essential to obtain an LL.M. degree at a major U.S. or 
U.K. law school; otherwise, they will not be conversant in global legal 
techniques.51 This view is reinforced by intergovernmental organiza-
tions, such as the World Bank, which usually insist that their lawyers 
possess a master’s degree.52 Yet, as one big law firm partner said, “It 
doesn’t matter where you got your legal education as basically we do 
the same thing over and over. Once you’ve been trained in the firm you 
have your skills.”53 
C. Common Law: The Facilitator of Law Firm Globalization 
 The common law has had an integral role in the globalization of 
U.S. and U.K. law firms. Law firms desiring to become global needed 
creative lawyering to facilitate their firms’ progress and to deal with the 
regulatory obstacles that were put in their way.54 The type of law prac-
tice that facilitated business had to be expert, had to be well-connected 
with the regulatory authorities, and had to know how to invoke disput-
ing practices as well as negotiating skills.55 
 The sociologist Max Weber argued that the best form of lawmaking 
for modern capitalism is formally rational—internally coherent without 
having to appeal to any phenomena or noumena external to the sys-
tem.56 According to Weber, the formal rationality was idealized in the 
civilian system of lawmaking, yet the advance of capitalism did not occur 
in countries that subscribed to civil codes.57 
 Instead, real progress was found within systems of substantive ra-
tionality—those that, although coherent, also appealed to external 
forces such as policy or custom.58 The openness of these substantively 
rational systems provided a malleability unfound in the civilian sys-
                                                                                                                      
51 Id. See generally Carole Silver, States Side Story: Career Paths of International LL.M. Stu-
dents, or “I Like to Be in America,” 80 Fordham L. Rev. 2383 (2012) (summarizing empirical 
evidence on the careers of international law graduates who earned an LL.M. degree in the 
United States, and using the study to suggest the implications for the way the United States 
understands credentials and the global legal profession). 
52 Flood, supra note 16, at 54. 
53 Interview with a Corporate Lawyer from Clifford Chance, in London, Eng. (Apr. 
2005). The interview was premised on confidentiality. 
54 Flood, supra note 16, at 47. 
55 Id. 
56 Max Weber, 2 Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology 
641–43 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., Bedminster Press 1968) (1922). 
57 Flood, supra note 16, at 47; see Anthony T. Kronman, Max Weber 118–46 (1983). 
58 Flood, supra note 16, at 47. 
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tems.59 Because the financial markets were pushing at great speeds, 
lawmaking needed to respond with similar alacrity.60 
 This substantively rational concept of lawmaking embodied a par-
ticular style of lawyering and reproduction of lawyers.61 The civilian 
codes attracted the academic lawyers who constantly sought to polish 
and refine their internally coherent systems.62 This push toward consis-
tency in the civil codes was made at the expense of rapid response to 
situations as they occurred in real time.63 Therefore, it is not surprising 
that academics took the principal role in producing the future genera-
tions of lawyers, imbuing in them a reverence for the sanctity of the 
code above all else.64 
 Weber clearly observed the paramountcy of the English bar and 
the English common law in responding to commercial exigencies.65 
Unlike the civilian codes, the common law system was piecemeal and 
ad hoc, with no desire to be polished to some pristine state.66 It was 
content to be rough, as were its practitioners who, although they did 
not entirely scorn the academy, frequently had degrees in subjects 
other than law.67 The common law lawyers were trained through ap-
prenticeship and by learning on the job.68 Law was a craft skill, not a 
theoretical pursuit for philosophers.69 As Weber put it: 
Not only was systematic and comprehensive treatment of the 
whole body of the law prevented by the craftlike specialization 
of the lawyers, but legal practice did not aim at all at a rational 
system but rather at a practically useful scheme of contracts 
and actions, oriented towards the interests of clients in typi-
cally recurrent situations.70 
Thus, Anglo-American jurisprudence was unfettered and not beholden 
to law as an idealistic form. 
                                                                                                                      
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Flood, supra note 16, at 47. 
65 2 Weber, supra note 56, at 787; Flood, supra note 16, at 48. 
66 Flood, supra note 16, at 48. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Id. 
70 2 Weber, supra note 56, at 787. 
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 The advantage of common law was that freedom of contract per-
mitted the flexibility to construct contracts as freestanding documents 
not tied to the ambitions of a code. Typical contracts in jurisdictions 
following the civil tradition are only a few pages in length, whereas the 
English or American contracts typically consist of hundreds or thou-
sands of pages.71 The English and American contracts leave nothing to 
external confirmation: if it is not in the contract, it does not exist. 
Thus, contracts create a system of private ordering that symbolically 
invokes the state but, in regards to actual conduct, obscures it.72 Under 
the common law, contract means the privatization of law, which in turn 
represents the comparative advantage of Anglo-American law and its 
practitioners. It is the reason why Anglo-American law has been so suc-
cessful in the international arena. 
 Because contract allows for virtually any normative system to con-
stitute its base, choice of law provisions are used for instrumental pur-
poses rather than concerns of jurisdictional fidelity.73 Further, if finan-
cial services are one of the key engines of globalization, then there are 
only a few jurisdictions with appropriate rules and norms.74 For all 
practical purposes, there are only two appropriate jurisdictions: English 
law and New York State law.75 These sources of law are represented by 
the city principalities of London and New York, and these cities are 
emblematic of their states’ legal, financial, and cultural power and au-
thority.76 At some point, most transnational agreements are transcribed 
into one or both of these systems.77 Thus, this provides New York and 
London law firms with distinct advantages over firms from other lo-
cales.78 
 Moreover, New York and London law firms will actively market 
their jurisdictions to maintain their competitive advantage.79 For ex-
ample, the City of London Law Society, responding to the British gov-
                                                                                                                      
71 Flood, supra note 16, at 48. 
72 Id. See generally Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 L. & Soc’y Rev. 
91 (2003) (arguing that contracts can be viewed as social artifacts that evidence both the 
private ordering of the parties that created them and the culture of those parties). 
73 Flood, supra note 16, at 48. 
74 Id.; see Flood, supra note 41, at 252; supra notes 39–42 and accompanying text. 
75 E.g., John Flood, Capital Markets, Globalisation and Global Elites, in Transnational 
Legal Processes: Globalisation and Power Disparities 114, 115 (Michael Likosky ed., 
2002); Flood, supra note 41, at 252; Flood, supra note 16, at 48. 
76 Saskia Sassen, The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo 4 (2d ed. 2001); 
Flood, supra note 16, at 48–49. 
77 Flood, supra note 16, at 49. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
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ernment’s Green Paper on the work and organization of the legal pro-
fession promulgated in 1989, wrote: “The advantages of English law as a 
‘product’ enable solicitors to contribute to this country’s balance of 
payments some £25,000,000 per annum in invisible exports and consti-
tute an important part of the attraction of the City of London as a 
world financial centre.”80 
 In addition to its internal benefits and strengths, there are other 
reasons for the dominance of Anglo-American law. One such reason is 
the concept of path dependence.81 Path dependence is the notion that 
current and future states, actions, or decisions depend upon the past.82 
Under the theory of path dependence, where an entity already domi-
nates the market, there are particular disincentives for others to enter 
the market because there are substantial transaction costs involved in 
the attempt.83 The examples of the QWERTY typewriter keyboard and 
VHS videotapes confirm how sets of early and continuing adopters can 
create historical lock-ins that are difficult to change.84 Thus, the flexi-
bility of Anglo-American law in responding to the needs of emerging 
capital markets, Anglo-American law’s strength in private ordering 
through contract, and the likelihood that Anglo-American law’s market 
dominance has precluded market entry by other market competitors 
have all enabled law firms to act locally but operate globally. 
II. The Born Global Concept 
 The idea of “Born Globals” or “International New Ventures” de-
rives from research undertaken on new companies that have developed 
in communications, software, bioengineering, and even clothing retail 
(e.g., Zara).85 Born Globals tend to be small and adaptable to different 
environments.86 The speed with which they advance in international 
                                                                                                                      
80 See Flood, supra note 16, at 49 (citing City of London Law Soc’y, The Work and 
Organisation of the Legal Profession: A Response to the Government’s Green 
Paper 5 (1989)). 
81 Flood, supra note 16, at 49. 
82 See Scott E. Page, Essay, Path Dependence, 1 Q.J. Pol. Sci. 87, 88 (2006). 
83 Flood, supra note 16, at 49. 
84 W. Brian Arthur, Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, and Lock-In by Historical 
Events, 99 Econ. J. 116, 116 (1989); Flood, supra note 16, at 49. 
85 E.g., S. Tamer Cavusgil & Gary Knight, Born Global Firms: A New Interna-
tional Enterprise 11 (2009) (noting that one of the distinctive features of Born Globals 
is that they are found across most industries); Michael W. Rennie, Born Global, McKinsey 
Q., no. 4, 1993, at 45, 49 (showing the percentage of Born Global firms across the various 
industries in Australia). Although they are spread across industries, Born Global firms tend 
to be heavily concentrated in high-technology industries. Cavusgil & Knight, supra, at 11. 
86 See Cavusgil & Knight, supra note 85, at 11. 
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markets distinguishes them from traditional internationalization strate-
gies of multinational enterprises.87 This is not to say that they may not 
become large businesses; the technology market is replete with exam-
ples of such companies—Blackberry and Apple are two. Further, Born 
Globals have products or services with global market potential.88 The 
products and services that Born Globals produce have unique tech-
nologies based on specific knowledge bases and a competitive advan-
tage developed in the domestic market.89 
 One group of scholars has attempted to delineate the characteris-
tics and strategies used by Born Globals.90 Those scholars have stated 
that the key attributes of Born Globals are: (1) their speed of action; 
(2) their quick response times; and (3) their ability to learn.91 They 
have further identified three main phases through which successful 
Born Globals travel: (1) introductory;92 (2) growth and resource accu-
mulation;93 and (3) break-out and required strategies.94 
A. Born Global Phase One: Introductory 
 In the introductory phase, Born Globals have inadequate organiza-
tional structures and limited resources.95 Their capital consists of the 
talents and skills of their founders and key individuals.96 The main 
channel for growth is through networking and attracting financing from 
venture capitalists.97 The need for venture capitalist financing, however, 
functions uniquely in the law firm context.98 U.S. law firms are prohib-
ited from having non-lawyer ownership, whereas U.K. law firms are not 
barred from outside capital under the Legal Services Act of 2007.99 
                                                                                                                      
 
87 Rennie, supra note 85, at 45–46 (comparing traditional firms with Born Global firms). 
88 Mika Gabrielsson et al., Born Globals: Propositions to Help Advance the Theory, 17 Int’l 
Bus. Rev. 385, 388 (2008). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. at 387–88. 
91 See id. at 391–92, 397, 399. 
92 Id. at 391–95; see infra notes 95–109 and accompanying text. 
93 Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 396; see infra notes 110–117 and accompanying 
text. 
94 Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 397; see infra notes 118–135 and accompanying 
text. In utilizing the Born Global as a model in the law firm and professional services con-
text, we must be careful as not all parts of the model apply but significant parts do. 
95 Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 391. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. at 391, 395. 
98 See infra notes 277–289 and accompanying text. 
99 See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(d); infra 275–289 and accompanying text 
(discussing the U.K. regulatory scheme as it applies to law firms). For U.S. law firms, Rule 
5.4(d) of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits non-lawyer ownership in-
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 At the introductory phase, it is imperative that Born Globals have 
strong internal resources with respect to talent but also solid links with 
clients.100 There are many examples of law firms with charismatic and 
powerful leaders who created significant firms based on their skills and 
innate resources. Paul Cravath of Cravath101 and Russell Baker of Baker 
& McKenzie102 are key examples, as are modern counterparts, Joe Flom 
of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & Flom LLP103 and Marty Lipton of 
Wachtell Lipton.104 In the United Kingdom, the preeminent examples 
are John Morris of Ashurst Morris Crisp,105 William Captel Slaughter 
and William May of Slaughter and May,106 George Allen and Thomas 
Overy of Allen & Overy LLP,107 and Sir Nigel Knowles of DLA Piper.108 
Each of these individuals devised his own firm, developed strategies for 
                                                                                                                      
terests in a firm that provides legal services. Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R. 5.4(d). If a 
non-lawyer possesses an ownership interest, the law firm is in violation of the ABA’s ethical 
rules. See id. Although not controlling unless adopted by a given jurisdiction, all fifty states 
have adopted a version of Model Rule 5.4(d). See Horaist v. Doctor’s Hosp. of Opelousas, 25 
F.3d 261, 266 (5th Cir. 2001) (stating that the Supreme Court of Louisiana’s rules of profes-
sional conduct are identical to the ABA’s Model Rules). See generally Adoption of the ABA Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct and Comments, Am. Bar Ass’n (May 23, 2011), available at http:// 
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/cpr/pic/comments.authcheckdam.pdf 
(cataloging which U.S. states have adopted the ABA Model Rules). 
100 See Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 391. 
101 See generally 1 & 2 Robert T. Swaine, The Cravath Firm and Its Predecessors 
1819–1947 (2006) (describing the origins and founding of Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP). 
102 See generally Jon R. Bauman, Pioneering a Global Vision: The Story of Baker & 
McKenzie (1999) (summarizing the origins and founding of Baker & McKenzie). 
103 See generally Lincoln Caplan, Skadden: Power, Money, and the Rise of a Legal 
Empire (1993) (examining the origins and founding of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher, & 
Flom LLP). 
104 See William H. Starbuck, Keeping a Butterfly and an Elephant in a House of Cards: The 
Elements of Exceptional Success, 30 J. Mgmt. Stud. 885, 898–901 (1993) (describing the ori-
gins of Wachtell and Marty Lipton’s influence on the firm). 
105 See Dennett, supra note 35, at 20–37 (describing John Morris’s work and how he in-
fluenced and mentored William Slaughter). See generally Judy Slinn, Ashurst Morris Crisp: 
A Radical Firm (1997) (detailing the origins and founding of Ashurst Morris Crisp). In 
2003, Ashurst Morris Crisp changed its name to Ashurst in an attempt to rebrand the firm. 
Ashurst Morris Crisp Changes Name to Ashurst in Major Rebranding, Ashurst (Dec. 8, 2003), 
http://www.ashurst.com/media-item.aspx?id_Content=571&expandOfficeList=true&id_ 
queryContent=&showDeals=true. 
106 See generally Dennett, supra note 35 (discussing the origins and founding of Slaugh-
ter and May). 
107 See generally Humphrey Keenlyside, Allen & Overy: The Firm 1930–1998 (1999) 
(describing the origins of Allen & Overy). 
108 See Our People: Sir Nigel Knowles, DLA Piper, http://www.dlapiper.com/nigel_knowles/ 
(last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (describing Sir Nigel Knowles’ career and history with DLA Piper). 
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its development domestically and internationally, and had particular 
skills that were in scarce supply and high demand from clients.109 
B. Born Global Phase Two: Growth and Resource Accumulation 
 The second phase prepares the Born Global for globalization. At 
this stage, a Born Global must learn from its networks and its clients.110 
In addition, it must accumulate financial resources for the push to in-
ternationalization.111 The Born Global entity must select the countries 
to which it will extend, and, to an extent, must be entrepreneurial 
about its ventures.112 
 How a Born Global firm enters into and fares in a foreign market 
depends on cultural factors, developments in the market, relationships, 
and language.113 One of the most difficult challenges facing a Born 
Global at this stage is synchronization, or organizational entrainment: 
how do Born Globals and their clients overcome the psychological dis-
tance of foreignness with their international clients to create a tempo-
ral “fit?”114 
 Law firms have two ways of overcoming the barriers of temporal 
misfit. One is to have domestic clients lead the way into foreign markets 
for them.115 This is the client-led global move and is the most typical. 
The other option is to create a form of legal technology that can be 
employed to take clients overseas.116 
 English and American law firms have the singular advantage of 
being proximate to the world’s capital markets, which like to use their 
respective laws.117 Law firms with overseas offices therefore provide a 
conduit back into their domestic bases by providing access to a range of 
professional services in addition to their own. 
                                                                                                                      
109 See supra notes 101–108 and accompanying text. 
110 Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 396. 
111 See id. 
112 See id. 
113 Svante Andersson, Internationalization in Different Industrial Contexts, 19 J. Bus. Ven-
turing 851, 855 (2004). 
114 Susanna Khavul et al., Organizational Entrainment and International New Ventures from 
Emerging Markets, 25 J. Bus. Venturing 104, 105 (2010); see Andersson, supra note 113, at 
854–55. 
115 See John Flood, Megalawyering in the Global Order: The Cultural, Social and Economic 
Transformation of Global Legal Practice, 3 Int’l J. Legal Prof. 169, 197 (1996). 
116 Russell Baker’s expansion of the use of the Western Hemisphere Trade Corpora-
tion is an example of the creation of legal technology. See Bauman, supra note 102, at 22–
26. See infra notes 161–167 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra notes 73–80 and accompanying text. 
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C. Born Global Phase Three: Break-Out and Required Strategies 
 The final phase for the Born Global firm is the break-out phase, 
where it consolidates its strategies and has a coherent global vision.118 
This phase typifies market acceptance and signifies that the Born 
Global has become an established global player. In the case of law 
firms, the establishment of firms as global players is apparent in the 
modern strategies that law firms use to attempt to dominate the global 
marketplace. 
 Law firms such as Clifford Chance, Baker & McKenzie, and DLA 
Piper are entrenched globally with the numbers of lawyers and offices 
they have established around the world.119 A few firms have resisted the 
physical globalization of establishing their own offices globally. Instead, 
these firms choose to remain domestically based but linked globally 
with networks of foreign law firms.120 Examples include Cravath, and 
Slaughter and May.121 
 In order for Born Globals, and by extension globalizing law firms, 
to accomplish their entry into world markets, the temporal issues are 
crucially important.122 Organizational entrainment is a hurdle for 
firms.123 The farther they go from their home countries, the more they 
must cope with difference in institutional structures and practices.124 
                                                                                                                      
118 See Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 397. 
119 See About Us, supra note 10; DLA Piper LLP, supra note 10; Firm Facts, supra note 15; 
supra notes 13–15 and accompanying text. 
120 See, e.g., Global Reach, Slaughter & May, http://www.slaughterandmay.com/where-
we-work/global-reach.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (describing that the firm’s global ap-
proach is to work with other law firms that are leaders in their jurisdictions); International 
Approach, Slaughter & May, http://www.slaughterandmay.com/where-we-work/interna- 
tional-approach.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (describing the firm’s international inte-
grated teams’ approach to dealing with clients in other jurisdictions); International Practice 
Overview: Global Network of Law Firms, Cravath, Swaine & Moore LLP, http://www.cravath. 
com/practices/DetailExtended.aspx?FirmService=6 (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) (indicating 
that the firm works with a network of leading law firms throughout the world). 
121 Global Reach, supra note 120; International Practice Overview: Global Network of Law 
Firms, supra note 120. 
122 See Khavul et al., supra note 114, at 105. 
123 See id. 
124 See Andersson, supra note 113, at 885 (discussing the concept of psychic distance in 
the context of internationalization); Khavul et al., supra note 114, at 104–05 (providing an 
overview of organizational entrainment and how it factors into globalization); supra notes 
48–53 and accompanying text (describing the concept of globalizing law firms acting 
globally while thinking locally). 
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Hence, there is a strong emphasis on learning and accumulating re-
sources for the break-out, if it happens.125 
 In order for law firms to deal with the differences in institutional 
structures, it is important for lawyers to understand institutional struc-
ture and analysis. According to at least one scholar, there are three 
elements to the institutional analysis: the regulative, the normative, and 
the cultural-cognitive.126 Law firms must be adept at negotiating all 
three elements. The regulative element is typically a fundamental one 
in that not only must law firms adhere to foreign norms, but they must 
also bring them into line with their domestic rules.127 These can affect 
firm formation: for example, which name or names can be used, who 
can be hired, who can become a partner, and more.128 The normative 
element takes into account the conceptual aspects of lawyer-client rela-
tionships—long-term versus short-term—and the composition of law 
firms—large and bureaucratized or small and personal.129 The cultural-
cognitive element highlights differences between the lawyers taking the 
common law and those taking the civil law approach.130 The former 
seek creative solutions for clients, based on business activities, whereas 
the latter interpret the law in line with the civil code.131 
 For law firms seeking to reach the break-out phase, moments of 
instability often provide valuable opportunities for law firms to enter 
new global markets.132 Law firms can insert themselves into temporal 
and regulatory gaps and disruptions that enable them to establish their 
models and modes of practice.133 For example, one pair of scholars 
cites English law firms entering Germany after its unification.134 Given 
the resistance Germany received from having rules that deterred Eng-
lish modes of practice, Germany re-regulated its legal profession in the 
                                                                                                                      
125 See Gabrielsson et al., supra note 88, at 396 (describing the importance of resource 
accumulation and organizational learning during the second phase of Born Globals—the 
phase immediately preceding the break-out phase). 
126 W. Richard Scott, Institutions and Organizations: Ideas and Interests 50–
59 (2008). 
127 See id. at 52–54. 
128 See id. 
129 See James Faulconbridge & Daniel Muzio, Transnational Corporations and Institu-
tional Change: Institutional (In)stability Determining Firm Strategy and Impacts. The 
Case of English Law Firms in Germany, tbl. 3 (2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with author). 
130 See Scott, supra note 126, at 56–59. 
131 See id.; supra notes 54–83, 168–274 and accompanying text. 
132 See Faulconbridge & Muzio, supra note 129, at 3–4. 
133 See id. at 6–10. 
134 Id. at 12–26 (describing the presence of English law firms in Germany between 
1985 and 2010). 
2013] Boston College International & Comparative Law Review 1103 
early 2000s to align itself more with Anglo-American practices, which 
allowed English law firms to become dominant players.135 Thus, law 
firms may succeed in entrenching themselves in global markets by tak-
ing advantage of these gaps and disruptions in foreign markets, serving 
as an example to Born Globals of a possible means of achieving the 
break-out phase in their development. 
III. Lawyers as a Globalizing Force: Case Studies of  
Global Lawyers’ Work 
 This Part demonstrates how lawyers and law firms took advantage 
of temporal disjunctions and normative gaps to facilitate their moves 
into foreign and global markets, in some situations quite radically.136 
The case studies used here emerge from research I have undertaken on 
the globalization of lawyers’ work over the last twenty years. The ease 
with which lawyers have moved into these lines of work has particularly 
struck me. Section A of this Part discusses the juncture of public and 
private law’s impact on globalization and highlights the issues for glob-
alization under private law.137 Section B examines some of the early ex-
amples of lawyers globalizing, and Section C discusses some modern 
examples.138 
A. The Juncture of Private and Public Law in Globalization 
 The process of globalization in law is not a smooth, graduated 
program. The reason for this is in the juncture of private and public 
law.139 Ordinarily, law is thought of as being primarily local, dealing 
with domestic issues—whether corporate or individual. For example, 
two recent cases in the U.K. Supreme Court defied the trend toward 
globalization of law when the court held that foreign judgments would 
not be easily enforceable in the United Kingdom unless certain condi-
                                                                                                                      
135 Id. at 15, 20–26. 
136 See infra notes 137–274 and accompanying text. 
137 See infra notes 139–151 and accompanying text. 
138 See infra notes 152–274 and accompanying text. 
139 Private law is law concerning private persons, property, and relationships, whereas 
public law is law that deals with “regulating the relations of individuals with the government 
and the organization and conduct of the government itself.” Private Law, Merriam-Webster, 
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/private+law (last visited Apr. 19, 2013); Public 
Law, Merriam-Webster, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/public+law (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2013). 
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tions were met.140 These two insolvency cases demonstrate the power 
and dominion of the public law sphere.141 
 Another example of this tension emerged in the operation of the 
pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts.142 Every lawyer copied the 
same clause and believed it inviolate until a Belgian court ruled against 
it.143 Curiously, that decision did not appear to change the behavior of 
the sovereign debt lawyers; somehow it went against their basic in-
stincts.144 
 This Section focuses primarily on the private law aspects of global-
ization. One major problem business people have in transnational 
business is overcoming their suspicions of “the other.” Where business 
people come from different cultures and legal systems, there are 
doubts, uncertainties, and problems creating trust. Arms-length con-
tractual negotiations are a key way to overcome such difficulties. In or-
der to succeed, the lawyers involved must be seen as trustworthy, either 
through their status or the longevity of their firm.145 Moreover, court 
and arbitration systems must be calculated to be predictable, incor-
ruptible, and fair.146 
                                                                                                                      
 
140 See Rubin v. Eurofinance SA & New Cap Reinsurance Corp. v. A.E. Grant, [2012] 
UKSC 46, [7], [10], [105]–[106], [115]–[132] (appeal taken from Eng.). The U.K. Su-
preme Court specifically noted that the common law “Dicey rule” was applicable to the 
foreign insolvency judgments. See id. Under the Dicey rule, a court outside the United 
Kingdom has the jurisdiction to issue an in personam judgment capable of enforcement in 
the United Kingdom if the person against whom the judgment was given: (1) was present 
in the foreign country; (2) was a claimant or counterclaimed in the proceeding in the 
foreign court; (3) submitted to the foreign court’s jurisdiction by voluntarily appearing at 
the proceedings; or (4) had, before the proceedings commenced, agreed to submit to the 
jurisdiction of that court. Id. at [7]. 
141 See id. at [7], [10], [105]–[106], [115]–[132]. 
142 See generally Mark Weidemaier et al., Origin Myths, Contracts, and the Hunt for Pari 
Passu, 38 L. & Soc. Inquiry 72 (2013) (examining the use of the pari passu clause by cor-
porate lawyers in contracts). 
143 Id. at 72–74. 
144 See id. at 72, 95–96. 
145 One means of establishing and burnishing status is for law firms to take on as part-
ners or of counsel senior officials who have stepped down from government posts—this is 
a common practice among U.S. and U.K. law firms. See, e.g., Margaret Hilary Marshall, 
Choate, http://www.choate.com/people/margaret-marshall (last visited Apr. 19, 2013) 
(providing the biography of a former state court justice who is now of counsel at a U.S. law 
firm); Andy Richardson, Ex Rat Catcher and Government Speech Writer Joins North-East Law Firm, 
N. Echo (Mar. 26, 2013 7:00 PM), http://www.thenorthernecho.co.uk/business/law/10308 
386.print/ (describing a former government official’s move to a U.K. law firm). And re-
garding longevity, both countries have traditions of long-established law firms. See supra 
notes 10–47, 54–84, 101–109 and accompanying text. 
146 See Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 Cornell 
L. Rev. 1, 3–4 (2008). The recent example of the Berezovsky v. Abramovich litigation in the U.K. 
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 Additionally, there are other elements that should be taken into 
account in transnational business. Social networks can provide suffi-
cient stability for contracting. For example, Jewish diamond merchants 
rely on strong ethnic networks to ensure contractual obligations are 
fulfilled.147 Similarly, networks are present within industries that sustain 
more informal and flexible modes of stabilizing legal structures and 
support across borders.148 These include the timber and software in-
dustries.149 
 The concept of developing networks is an instance of transnational 
law—as opposed to international law—that has been an integral part of 
commercial life for many hundreds of years.150 Although professional-
ism was a concept that emerged mainly in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries, the essence of professionalism had been in existence 
much longer, and lawyers have been involved in these activities as coun-
selors and advocates in one form or another.151 
                                                                                                                      
 
Commercial Court demonstrated the profound mistrust of the Russian legal system and 
courts. The case between Russian oligarchs had no real connection with the United Kingdom 
whatsoever, but the parties both acknowledged the jurisdiction of the English court, as it 
would be difficult for the plaintiff to receive a fair trial in Russia. Berezovsky v. Abramovich, 
[2012] EWHC (Comm) 2463, [2], [4], [38]–[89] (Eng.). 
147 Barak D. Richman, Ethnic Networks, Extra-Legal Certainty and Contractual Certainty and 
Globalisation: Peering into the Diamond Industry, in Contractual Certainty in Interna-
tional Trade: Empirical Studies and Theoretical Debates on Institutional Sup-
port for Global Economic Exchanges 31, 35 (Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009) [hereinafter 
Contractual Certainty in International Trade]. 
148 See generally Thomas Dietz & Holger Nieswandt, The Emergence of Transnational Coop-
eration in the Software Industry, in Contractual Certainty in International Trade, su-
pra note 147, at 87 (examining cross-border contractual agreements in the field of out-
sourcing software development); Wioletta Konradi, The Role of Lex Mercatoria in Supporting 
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how commercial norms, contracts, and customs function in the self-governance of the 
timber industry). 
149 See generally Thomas Dietz, Contract Law, Relational Contracts, and Reputational Net-
works in International Trade: An Empirical Investigation into Cross-Border Contracts in the Software 
Industry, 37 L. & Soc. Inquiry 25 (2012) (investigating contract enforcement institutions 
in cross-border software purchases); Dietz & Nieswandt, supra note 148, at 87 (examining 
cross-border contractual agreements in the field of outsourcing software development); 
Konradi, supra note 148, at 49 (investigating how commercial norms, contracts, and cus-
toms function in the self-governance of the timber industry). 
150 See Peer Zumbansen, Transnational Law, in Elgar Encyclopedia of Comparative 
Law 738, 738–40 ( Jan M. Smits ed., 2006) (stating that transnational law developed along-
side international law but is itself a supplementary source of law). 
151 See id. at 740. See generally David Scuilli, Professions Before Professionalism, 48 Eur. J. 
Soc. 121 (2007) (arguing that the visual academies in France exhibited professionalism 
prior to the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries). The fact that lawyers applied the early 
1106 Boston College Law Review [Symposium Issue 
B. Globalizing Lawyers: The Early Examples 
 An early documented instance of globalizing lawyers is John Mor-
ris of Ashurst Morris Crisp in the nineteenth century. The firm’s com-
mercial work focused on merchant banking, large-scale retail trading, 
and railways, and Morris “showed a particular flair for this kind of 
work.”152 In fact, Morris was retained as advisor to the shareholders of 
the Grand Trunk Railway of Canada in the 1860s.153 His contemporar-
ies described him as “‘a director of 13 successful public enterprises’ 
who had ‘frequently been employed . . . to start at a few hours’ notice, 
on a voyage across the Atlantic to assist in unraveling some vast compli-
cation in the American railway system.’”154 
 Moreover, his firm had become very active in major company for-
mations.155 Because of his work for the large retailer, Morrisons, Morris 
gained experience in Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay.156 An Argentin-
ian newspaper of the period said: 
In the last ten years nothing worth the name of “business” has 
been done in the River Plate without John Morris being con-
sulted first. . . . When Mr. Morris has a mind to it, his clients 
will gather in 24 hours to form a syndicate for any undertak-
ing whatever may be the capital required, and – still more cu-
rious – they will do it without taking the trouble of confirming 
that the business is a good one: Morris has arranged matters, 
and that is enough.157 
 By the 1880s, John Morris acted for over 300 client companies, of 
which: 
61 were involved in mining, and well over half of them were 
mining gold in Western Australia, Queensland, Matabeleland 
or the Transvaal. Another 29 were exploration and develop-
ment companies seeking mineral wealth in those regions, and 
in Rhodesia. 31 were financial, land and investment compa-
nies, many active in the United States; 31 were concerned 
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with commodities, both mineral and edible, world-wide; 27 
were railway companies, active in various parts of the world, 
and another 27 were constructing or supplying gas and light, 
water or communication systems.158 
 Like Morris and Ashurst Morris Crisp, most of the London law 
firms at this time reflected this international cast to their business. An-
other example is Norman Herbert Smith, progenitor of Herbert 
Smith.159 His clients included the Honduras Banking and Trading 
Company, Arauco, a Chilean railway, and Hotchkiss Ordnance Com-
pany, which supplied machine guns to the U.S. military.160 These Eng-
lish lawyers capitalized on London’s success as the financial center of 
the world and the flexibility of English law to accommodate the needs 
of business. 
 American law was similarly adaptable as the founder of Baker & 
McKenzie, Russell Baker, demonstrated in the 1950s.161 After establish-
ing that the law firm would be a global law firm, Baker found a way to 
internationalize its work quickly.162 The Western Hemisphere Trade 
Corporation (“WHTC”) was part of the Internal Revenue Code, and 
Baker saw a way to extend its use.163 The law essentially gave U.S. com-
panies tax incentives to manufacture abroad.164 With Baker’s interpreta-
tion of English common law rules, American exporters could also re-
ceive the tax breaks of the WHTC for selling products abroad without 
manufacturing them abroad.165 The difference between the nineteenth-
century English lawyers and the American mid-twentieth-century ones 
was that the English lawyers saw no need to open foreign offices: they 
could direct affairs from London.166 By the time of the post-World War 
II period, however, it was becoming necessary to follow business and 
clients overseas, which meant offices needed to be established there.167 
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C. Modern Examples of the Globalizing Influence of Lawyers  
and the Common Law 
 Lawyers and the common law continue to have a globalizing influ-
ence.168 This Section focuses on three major case studies: (1) settling 
the Maxwell bankruptcy;169 (2) the sale of Celtel International B.V., an 
international mobile telephone company, to the Mobile Telecommuni-
cations Company (“MTC”);170 and (3) the creation of the United King-
dom’s covered bond.171 
1. Settling a Global Bankruptcy: The Maxwell Insolvency 
 A striking example of the globalizing influence of lawyers and the 
common law is in insolvency. As previously mentioned, the U.K. Su-
preme Court was perceived as turning the tables on developments in 
this field in 2012.172 Until recently, insolvency or bankruptcy law was 
very local and had little to no international dimension to it. But in the 
early 1990s, when financier and newspaper magnate Robert Maxwell 
died in mysterious circumstances, the first major multinational bank-
ruptcy began.173 
 Neither the law nor most lawyers were ready for such an eventual-
ity. Maxwell’s companies were situated around the world, but the larg-
est and most significant were in the United States and the United 
Kingdom.174 On December 16, 1991, the directors of Maxwell Com-
munication Corporation (“MCC”) filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in 
New York.175 The next day, MCC applied for an Administration Order 
in the High Court of Justice in London.176 These were simultaneous 
                                                                                                                      
168 See infra notes 172–274 and accompanying text. 
169 See infra notes 172–192 and accompanying text. 
170 See infra notes 193–238 and accompanying text. 
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primary proceedings and the two systems were in opposition to each 
other.177 Under the United Kingdom’s administration proceedings, 
administrators who were insolvency professionals were appointed to 
replace the directors and management and to run the company di-
rectly.178 Under the Chapter 11 proceedings, the management peti-
tioned the court to appoint an examiner so that an appropriate rescue 
plan could be put to the court.179 
 The two sides—the U.K. administrators and the directors of 
MCC—were prepared to battle it out through litigation, which would 
have been to the detriment of the creditors and the companies, includ-
ing their employees and pensioners.180 The U.S. Bankruptcy Court 
judge began to persuade the parties to negotiate.181 In order to help 
them along she appointed an examiner: Richard Gitlin of Hebb & 
Gitlin in Hartford, Connecticut.182 He was selected because, as one of 
the partners in the firm said: 
We identified international insolvency as a field for the future 
back in 1980. We got active in international management and 
I became very involved in the International Bar Association’s 
international banking sub-committee. Richard became active 
in INSOL and went to their first meeting in Monte Carlo in 
1985. Considering they’re mostly accountants, it was an hon-
our when he became their first lawyer-chairman. You learn by 
reading a lot and meeting people and talking to them – most 
important is to sit down and talk to them about the prob-
lems.183 
 Although no international bankruptcy had occurred until then, 
Gitlin and his firm had thought a lot about it, strategized with the In-
ternational Bar Association (“IBA”) and INSOL International, a world-
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wide federation of insolvency professional membership associations, 
and essentially prepared a small group of global professionals to be 
ready when an international insolvency—like Maxwell—arose.184 The 
difficulty lay in persuading the unprepared to commit to an alien activ-
ity, namely negotiating a solution without battling it through the courts. 
 The English lawyers suspected they might lose in the American 
courts and so agreed to talk.185 Gitlin began to devise a Protocol, an 
instrument to share control and authority between the parties.186 The 
Protocol was based on his work with the IBA’s “Committee J” on inter-
national insolvency.187 The lawyers on both sides had less than a month 
to formulate a working Protocol because, apart from an injunction 
against the Americans in the English court, the judge concerned was 
leaving for his vacation.188 This was a drop-dead deadline. One of the 
lawyers described the final days and hours when tempers were blowing 
and threats were being issued: 
The negotiations went to 3 in the morning of New Year’s Eve. 
Gitlin was miserable; we all knew we’d had enough. We got 
together at 8 in the morning and cut a deal on the first draft 
and rushed it over to Lenny [Hoffman] who signed it and 
lifted the injunction against Shaffer [the U.S. CEO].189 
 The banks agreed to the deal and the Protocol was flown to New 
York where the U.S. judge signed it.190 Not long after the MCC insol-
vency was settled, Gitlin received a call from Weil, Gotshal & Manges 
LLP, which was dealing with the bankruptcy of Olympia & York—the 
then-owner of Canary Wharf—asking for a copy of the Protocol, as they 
had a case with similar circumstances to the Maxwell insolvency.191 The 
Protocol became a template, which eventually—after many years— 
worked its way into the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) rules.192 
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2. Selling an International Mobile Telephone Company: The Story of 
Celtel 
 By the twenty-first century, transnational deals were commonplace, 
and the big global law firms grew to accommodate these kinds of trans-
actions.193 In 2005, Celtel, a Dutch telecommunications company with 
5.3 million cell phone subscribers in Africa, sold eighty-five percent of 
its company to MTC of Kuwait, one of the Middle East’s largest tele-
communications companies.194 The lawyers who were instrumental in 
the transaction were from the international law firms of Clifford 
Chance, which acted for MTC, and Linklaters, which acted for 
Celtel.195 The lawyer-client relationships, however, were not always 
fixed.196 
 As the Lawyer, a legal news source, reported, Celtel was “Sub-
Saharan Africa’s largest mobile provider, with coverage in 13 countries 
and more than five million subscribers.”197 The buyer—MTC—had op-
erations in Kuwait, Iraq, Jordan, and Lebanon.198 Tim Schwarz of 
Linklaters said: 
MTC has what it calls its “three-by-three-by-three strategy.” . . . 
During the first three years – from 2002 to last year [2005] – it 
invested in its home region. In the second three years it began 
to invest in its surrounding neighbourhood, buying Celtel. It’s 
the third three years that will be the most interesting. That’s 
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when it plans to go global. It will be very interesting to see 
whether it makes it.199 
MTC’s purchase of Celtel was occurring in the second phase of MTC’s 
strategy.200 MTC approached Clifford Chance’s Dubai office, which 
worked on the deal with the firm’s London office.201 As part of this 
deal, Celtel asked the investment bank Goldman Sachs to run a con-
trolled auction.202 According to MTC’s lawyer, a partner in the London 
office, the bank sent letters “to anyone they could think of who might 
be interested in buying this business. Any mobile operator, any tele-
coms company, and private equity houses as well.”203 The MTC lawyer 
further explained: 
You start by getting the investment banks running the deals 
from London. And because they are based in London they 
will turn to the English firms because we have some of the 
biggest firms in the world and that means with size comes 
depth of experience. Sophistication naturally resides here.204 
 In the first stage of the deal, on Celtel’s behalf, Goldman Sachs 
approached approximately one hundred companies with a rough out-
line of the deal.205 The next stage was for Celtel to select, out of a field 
of ten to twenty, four to submit binding offers.206 At the final stage, two 
bidders would negotiate the final terms.207 The final sale price was $3.4 
billion.208 
 As with all deals, there is always a possibility that this kind of deal 
could turn sour and not be completed. This is partially due to the 
complexity of the funding arrangements required for a transaction of 
this size.209 In addition, these transactions usually involve leverage in 
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the form of debt, and, therefore, all types of guarantees have to be ar-
ranged, default conditions prepared, et cetera.210 
 Loans from four banks in the Middle East, the United Kingdom, 
Switzerland, and the United States funded this particular transaction.211 
Those banks were National Bank of Kuwait, UBS, Credit Suisse First 
Boston, and Barclays, all of which were represented by a single law firm 
in London—Allen & Overy.212 Allen & Overy needed “to ensure that 
the banks’ interests were protected under English law. If the sale were 
to fail, the vendor’s lawyers were running a parallel track with the sale 
to place an initial public offering in the market.”213 The lawyers hoped 
that the initial public offering of Celtel would be unnecessary.214 
 Although Celtel’s operations were based in Africa, its headquarters 
was in the Netherlands.215 No country in Africa “had the scale or so-
phistication in its legal market to handle such a large transaction.”216 
Some local African law firms, however, were used during the due dili-
gence part of the transaction to monitor minor regulatory matters.217 
One English lawyer stated, “‘it used to be the case that there was little 
or no in-house regulatory capacity at many of the telecoms companies. 
Increasingly they’ve skilled up.’”218 English lawyers investigated local 
contracts because the content and not the law was at issue.219 As Eng-
lish lawyers, they naturally used English law.220 MTC’s lawyer remarked: 
We need a lingua franca and that’s English law. The govern-
ing law of a transaction—a share acquisition—doesn’t really 
matter that much. The terms and mechanisms are pretty 
much identical regardless of whether it’s English, German, 
French or Dutch law. Obviously you take account of the pecu-
liarities of national law but the agreements will look the same 
and they will all be in the English language, even in France 
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where it’s technically illegal. But people pay the 300 euro fine 
and don’t mind.221 
 Even though Celtel had sixteen operating subsidiaries, MTC actu-
ally bought a single block of shares in a Dutch company in this transac-
tion.222 English law governed the share purchase agreement.223 The 
various minor, ancillary elements—such as the transfer documents 
which were Dutch shares—had to be done under Dutch law.224 The 
MTC lawyer said that, typically, share purchase agreements are drafted 
to be governed by local law.225 Yet, this was an exception because 
Celtel’s business was pan-African and there were over one hundred 
shareholders who came from a variety of locations.226 In addition, as 
the purchasers came from different places, English law provided a com-
mon locus.227 Thus, there were a significant variety of laws at play for 
the regulatory issues, but they were relatively insignificant to the overall 
structure of the transaction.228 
 The Celtel transaction therefore consisted of a combination of rela-
tively simple corporate law issues, complex regulatory matters, and 
complicated financing and tax issues.229 The lawyers were tasked with 
bringing these together into a set of coherent structures, which enabled 
the parties to complete the transaction under a range of headings that 
included private and state concerns.230 Additionally, the lawyers from 
the different law firms were accustomed to working with one another 
and the investment banks.231 Thus, these enduring networks and institu-
tional relationships were vital to the success of the transaction. 
 These relationships, however, were not as straightforward as they 
appeared.232 Although Clifford Chance had a long-standing relation-
ship with the acquirer, MTC, it had also previously advised Celtel on its 
plans to go public.233 On the other side of the transaction was 
Linklaters for Celtel, with whom Linklaters had a long-established rela-
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tionship.234 And, as previously mentioned, Allen & Overy represented 
all four banks.235 Shortly after the deal concluded, the Clifford Chance 
Dubai partner who brought in the deal to Clifford Chance left the firm 
to head Linklaters’ Dubai office.236 This was, as one reporter described 
it, “A canny bit of talent spotting.”237 Linklaters acted for MTC on sub-
sequent acquisitions, thereby ousting Clifford Chance as MTC’s counsel 
as a result of the lawyer’s move.238 
3. Creation of the U.K. Covered Bond 
 The creation of a special type of collateralized bond, known as 
“covered bonds,” demonstrates yet another example of lawyers and the 
common law having a globalizing effect.239 Covered bonds are securi-
ties backed by mortgage loans that remain on the issuer’s balance 
sheet,240 and “senior debt instrument[s] of the issuer having priority 
recourse to a pool of assets ringfenced from the other assets of the is-
suer[, which are] often regarded as substitutes for government debt.”241 
 Despite the crash during the recession in 2008, the secondary 
market in mortgages remains large.242 In 2004, the European Central 
Bank (“ECB”) reported that the volume of mortgage loans in Europe 
exceeded 4 trillion and was growing at a rate of eight percent a year.243 
In 2011, the market was around $25 billion.244 Yet, the covered bond 
market is an area with little European integration, and, as the ECB 
pointed out: 
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Less than 40% of mortgages are financed via the capital mar-
ket, the remainder is deposit financed. The two capital market 
instruments to fund mortgages—covered bonds and residen-
tial mortgage backed securities (RMBS)—are heterogeneous 
across countries because of differences in legal, tax and regu-
latory frameworks governing issuance in the respective juris-
dictions. Those cross-country differences have prevented a 
geographic diversification to take place. So far mortgage loan 
portfolios that underlie covered bond issuance or are backing 
RMBS transactions have been purely domestic.245 
 In some European countries outside the United Kingdom, includ-
ing Germany, France, and Ireland, legislation existed to issue covered 
bonds.246 The “Pfandbrief” is the mortgage-backed bond in Ger-
many.247 In Germany, the bank issues bonds that are secured on a ring-
fenced pool of mortgage-backed assets.248 Germany’s legislation pro-
tects the Pfandbrief so that, should the bank become insolvent, the 
bondholders are ahead of other creditors.249 The issued bonds have a 
low risk rating, and the assets have to match the outstanding claims, 
and, in fact, should exceed the assets to provide a cushion.250 Further, 
under the German Mortgage Bank Act of 1900, the bank is obligated to 
top up the assets as and when required.251 
 By contrast, in the United Kingdom, no such legislation existed. 
One of the major investment banks, in conjunction with a commercial 
bank, approached a securitization partner in a large London law firm to 
structure a vehicle that would achieve similar results to the Pfand-
brief.252 The banks wanted to “issue bonds over a pool of assets held by a 
bank, which would have a 20 percent risk weighting.”253 Thus, a lawyer 
crafted a functional equivalent through contract, which, in the contin-
ued absence of specific legislation, had to be credible to city investors.254 
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 The lawyer’s structure required the banks to issue bonds that were 
triple-A rated by the credit rating agencies.255 After that, a limited liabil-
ity partnership (LLP) was created, and the bank made a loan to the 
LLP from the proceeds of the bank’s bonds.256 The LLP then used the 
loan to pay the purchase price of a pool of mortgage loans, and the 
LLP guaranteed the obligations of the bank under the bonds.257 This 
permitted the bondholders access to the LLP’s assets if the bank be-
came insolvent, and the bank ensured that the pool of assets was 
“topped up.”258 
 The lawyer chose to use an LLP rather than a special purpose ve-
hicle to avoid the difficulties that trust law imposes and to keep it 
within the bank, as the deal was done on the balance sheet.259 As a law-
yer at a large corporate law firm in London remarked: 
We’d never drafted a mortgages trust before so we started by 
going down to the private client department that deals with 
trusts and trustees all the time. You start with a simple docu-
ment and change it. There’s lots of free drafting when you do 
something new. We rely on the other side to review it, and the 
rating agencies. And if there are real estate or tax issues my 
colleagues there will review it.260 
In addition, the bonds were over-collateralized by the assets, being ap-
proximately fifty percent more than needed to cover the bonds.261 The 
credit rating agencies imposed this requirement in exchange for giving 
the bonds a triple-A rating.262 The bank, as a member of the LLP, had a 
greater share of equity because of the over-collateralization and re-
ceived the excess back by virtue of a capital distribution.263 As the in-
venting lawyer pointed out, “It’s quite tidy.”264 
 The first covered bond in the United Kingdom was issued by 
HBOS (a U.K. banking and insurance company) in conjunction with 
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Dresdner Kleinwort Wasserstein, Goldman Sachs, and Citigroup; it was 
worth 3 billion.265 HBOS needed to fund its balance sheet so, even 
though it used techniques of the securitization process, it was “‘struc-
tured not [to] be a credit product’. . . . The aim was to produce a true 
swaps/government bond substitute.”266 Preparing the covered bond 
was long and expensive because the “[r]ating agencies together re-
quired five legal opinions before giving [it] their top ratings.”267 
 At the time it was created, the U.K. covered bond raised consider-
able controversy.268 Because the U.K. bond was created with a view to 
U.K. insolvency law, it had greater protection than the German Pfand-
brief.269 This meant that the returns on the U.K. covered bond were 
also greater, and this pulled investors from the Pfandbrief.270 The Ger-
man mortgage banks vocalized their dislike of the U.K. covered bond, 
arguing that the U.K. covered bond was not in accord with an Euro-
pean Union (EU) directive.271 Further, the English banks were uneasy 
because they wanted to reduce the risk weighting from twenty percent 
to ten percent.272 As a result, the English banks lobbied the Treasury 
and the Financial Services Authority to legislate.273 
 Thus, lawyers and the common law continue to have a profound 
globalizing impact, which can be seen from the great international 
Maxwell bankruptcy to the creation of the U.K. covered bond.274 
IV. Opening Up Regulatory Spaces in Law and Legal Practice 
 As lawyers and the common law have continued to be an integral 
part of globalization, the U.K. Legal Services Act (“LSA”) presents a 
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unique opportunity for U.K. law firms to surge ahead of their U.S. 
counterparts.275 This Part summarizes the LSA and articulates why it 
provides U.K. lawyers and law firms with an advantage over U.S. lawyers 
and law firms.276 
 The LSA was enacted in 2007.277 One of the aims of the LSA was to 
open up the legal services market to competition.278 Indeed, promot-
ing competition was one of the driving forces behind the legislation.279 
To accomplish this, the LSA opened up the English market for legal 
services to a range of alternative legal suppliers, termed Alternative 
Business Structures (“ABS”).280 In 2012, the Solicitors Regulation Au-
thority licensed the first ABS.281 About 150 applications for ABS ap-
proval are currently being processed.282 Licenses provided by the ABS 
under the LSA has led to an Australian law firm, Slater & Gordon, 
listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, buying an English law firm, 
Russell Jones & Walker, along with its companion business, Claims Di-
rect, a claims handling business.283 The new English venture has be-
come the ABS. 
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 The impact of the Legal Services Act of 2007 is still being evalu-
ated, and it is too early to say if it will have a considerable impact or lit-
tle. Large U.K. corporate global firms have not been affected yet. This 
is probably due to the fact that they have not needed the access to ex-
ternal capital, and they fear reaction from U.S. legal regulators. The 
New York State Bar Association has determinedly come out against 
such moves for New York lawyers and firms, to the chagrin of the large 
New York City law firms.284 In its Younger Report, which evaluated the 
advantages and disadvantages of non-lawyer ownership, the New York 
State Bar Association Task Force on Non-Lawyer Ownership essentially 
accepted the arguments of small firm lawyers, who represent the major-
ity of the bar, to oppose such heretical changes to American legal tradi-
tion.285 
 At some point in the future, possibly within the next five or ten 
years, larger U.K. firms will be attracted to external financing or taking 
the firm to market in an initial public offering. Then, the U.K. firms 
will have a significant advantage over the U.S. firms. Furthermore, this 
will give them considerable benefits in the global market. We only have 
to look at the success of the big accounting firms to see how this could 
be achieved. 
 In order for the U.K. firms to capitalize on this unique opportu-
nity, they must latch on to temporal instabilities when they occur, as 
they provide the gaps through which to push for changes to their ad-
vantage.286 More than likely, they will be employing the strategies of the 
Born Globals to reach out into a new global field that could be far-
reaching and multidisciplinary.287 Lawyers are inventive and creative in 
their work. If they combine with investment banks, or consulting firms, 
or accounting firms, they could leverage their skills and resources be-
yond their present limits.288 It will be interesting to see how law firms 
move into these new spaces and achieve their ultimate Born Global 
break-out.289 
                                                                                                                      
http://www.legalfutures.co.uk/latest-news/slater-gordon-to-enter-uk-market-with-54m-
purchase-of-russell-jones-walker. 
284 N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, Report of the Task Force on Nonlawyer Ownership 78–
79 (2012), available at http://www.nysba.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Home&template= 
/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&ContentID=123065 (stating that the Task Force opposed New 
York enacting any form of non-lawyer ownership by a vote of 16–1). 
285 See id. at 69–79. 
286 See supra notes 110–114, 132–135, 169–274 and accompanying text. 
287 See supra notes 85–135 and accompanying text. 
288 See supra notes 23–44, 98–99 and accompanying text. 
289 See supra notes 118–135 and accompanying text. 
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Conclusion 
 The structure of Born Globals has emerged as the modern type of 
company globalization. Unlike traditional companies that build slowly 
and then use their preexisting relationships to allow them to expand 
globally, Born Globals expand at an accelerated rate. Although the lit-
erature has recently started discussing Born Globals, law firms repre-
sent the precursors to the modern Born Global. At the Born Globals’ 
introductory phase, strong internal resources are fundamentally impor-
tant. The charismatic and powerful leaders of modern international 
law firms were able to build their firms’ business through marketing 
their skills and through their innate resources. Further, the opportunity 
for private ordering in the common law tradition provides a flexibility 
and freedom that has enabled U.S. and U.K. law firms to enter global 
markets more easily than their code-based civilian counterparts. The 
case studies of the Maxwell insolvency, the sale of Celtel, and the estab-
lishment of the U.K. covered bond all highlight that law firms and their 
lawyers have established themselves as integral global players. 
 The U.K. Legal Services Act of 2007, however, sets up a unique 
opportunity for U.K. law firms to pull ahead of U.S. law firms in the 
global market. Whereas non-lawyer ownership of law firms is strictly 
prohibited in the United States by the rules of professional conduct, 
U.K. firms are not similarly limited. Thus, the opportunity to obtain an 
Alternative Business Structures license under the Legal Services Act of 
2007 may provide them an opportunity to surpass U.S. firms in amass-
ing capital and delivering global legal services. Whether the U.K. firms 
exploit this discrepancy to achieve their ultimate breakout is something 
the world will be awaiting. 
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